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Marcin Kaczmarski 
Review essay 
The Sino-Russian relationship: fellow travellers in the West-dominated world 
 
Books reviewed in the essay: 
• China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics by Paul J. Bolt and 
Sharyl N. Cross, Oxford University Press 2018 
• China and Russia: the new rapprochement by Alexandr Lukin, Polity 2018 
• Russia and China. A Political Marriage of Convenience – Stable and Successful by 
Michal Lubina, Barbara Budrich Publishers 2017 
• A Wary Embrace. What the China-Russia relationship means for the world by Bobo 
Lo, Penguin and Lowy Institute 2017 
 
Introduction 
A decade ago, Beijing’s relations with Moscow were of marginal interest to China scholars. 
Such topics as growing Sino-American interdependence-cum-rivalry, engagement with East 
Asia or relations with the developing world overshadowed China’s relationship with its 
northern neighbour. Scholars preoccupied with Russia’s foreign policy did not pay much 
attention either, regarding the Kremlin’s policy towards China as part and parcel of Russia’s 
grand strategy directed towards the West. The main dividing line among those few who took a 
closer look ran between sceptics and alarmists. The former interpreted the post-Cold War 
rapprochement as superficial and envisioned an imminent clash of interests between the two 
states. The latter, a minority, saw the prospect of an anti-Western alliance in the making. 
Today, Sino-Russian relations have returned to the top of research agenda in international 
politics. A sharp political conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine, Sino-American 
tensions as well a recent backlash against China in the West rekindled interest in the ‘strategic 
partnership’ that had been publicized by Moscow and Beijing since the late-1990s. The 
question whether China and Russia might become allies began to loom large. 
Leading European and American think-tanks produced a number of reports in recent years, 
with the aim to explain the post-2014 surge in Sino-Russian cooperation (e.g. Bond 2016, 
Duchâtel and Godement 2016, Stronski and Ng 2018, Chase et al. 2017). Journal articles 
explored distinct aspects of the relationship, such as security and defence cooperation (e.g. 
Røseth 2018) energy and economy (e.g. Locatelli, Abbas, and Rossiaud 2017, Silvius 2018) as 
well as competition and cooperation in adjacent regions (e.g. Odgaard 2017). Scholars drew 
from the IR theory repertoire, reaching out to realist (Korolev 2016, Krickovic 2017), 
constructivist (Wishnick 2017) and domestic-level explanations (Wilson 2018) in order to 
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determine the causes and implications of closer ties between Moscow and Beijing. They 
interpreted Sino-Russian cooperation not only in terms of balancing the US, but also as an 
expression of status anxiety and national identity (Flikke 2016).  
The books discussed in this essay promise to add to this growing body of literature and shed 
new light on the Sino-Russian relationship from a variety of viewpoints: Western Europe, the 
US, Russia and Central Europe. This review essay starts by briefly introducing key arguments 
of each volume. It proceeds by analysing how the four books address the most fundamental 
questions concerning contemporary Sino-Russian relations: (i) how to interpret contemporary 
Russia-China relations; (ii) what are the key drivers that bring both states closer together; (iii) 
what are the limitations and obstacles to deeper cooperation; and (iv) what the relationship 
means for the West and the liberal international order. I conclude by exploring a broader 
relevance of these works for China Studies and International Relations. 
 
Interpreting Russia-China relations today 
All four authors agree that the Sino-Russian relationship does not constitute a fully-fledged 
political-military alliance. Neither Beijing nor Moscow are ready to take on extra obligations 
and support one another in case a conflict with a third party. Preferring flexibility and retaining 
room for manoeuvre, Russia and China avoid getting involved in the other side’s conflict with 
the West, be it over influence in Eastern and Central Europe or territorial claims in the South 
or East China Seas. If there is no Sino-Russian alliance, how to define the relationship? The 
answers that the four volumes bring are located along the spectrum: from a ‘partnership of 
convenience driven by concrete priorities and interests’ (Lo 2017, xiv-xv) and a ‘complicated, 
ambiguous, yet truly successful relationship’ (Lubina 2017, 283) to a ‘useful partnership with 
strong momentum that shapes international politics’ (Bolt and Cross 2018, 2) and a ‘close 
strategic partnership’ (Lukin 2018). 
In A Wary Embrace. What the China-Russia relationship means for the world, Bobo Lo 
presents the most sceptical approach towards Sino-Russian relations. Lo argues that 
incremental changes in the relationship, observed for the last decade, have not had a 
transformative effect. The bilateral relationship remains subordinated to each state’s policy 
towards the West. At the same time, inequality between the two parties increased significantly, 
making their relations more difficult to manage.  
In Michał Lubina’s Russia and China. A Political Marriage of Convenience – Stable and 
Successful, the asymmetry of the relationship becomes the central point of analysis. In its 
relations with Moscow, Lubina argues, Beijing aims to build a stable long-term asymmetric 
relationship, in which both sides gain but China benefits more. Lubina speaks of a ‘positive 
asymmetry’, by which he means that Russia accepts China’s growing power. He describes the 
current state of Sino-Russian relations as a ‘return to the past’, a modern version of the 17-18th 
centuries model of modus vivendi. At that time, the Qing China had the upper hand but Russia 
derived political and economic benefits without complete subordination.  
In China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics Paul Bolt and Sharyl Cross 
point to the growing scope of common interests between the two states and emphasise the 
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gradual broadening of the relationship. Simultaneously, they point to a number of limitations 
that persist and prevent the relationship from evolving into an alliance.  
In China and Russia: the new rapprochement, Alexandr Lukin presents the most optimistic 
assessment of the relationship. Lukin dismisses the growing power gap between Russia and 
China and portrays the relationship as pragmatic and shaped by what he sees as objective 
developments in global politics. Lukin prioritizes geopolitical and strategic aspects, while 
considering other dimensions of the relationship, including the economic one, secondary. 
The analyses of Lo and Lukin are located at the opposite ends of the spectrum with regard to 
how they assess the depth of Sino-Russian relations. What links their interpretations is the 
emphasis on continuity. They both argue that the general ramifications of the Sino-Russian 
relations have not changed much for the last two decades. The building blocks of today’s 
relationship were laid down in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with Gorbachev’s attempt at 
normalization and Yeltsin’s embrace of ‘strategic partnership’.  
Two other volumes pay more attention to changes in the relationship that have been taking 
place since the early-2000s. Their authors see the renewal of Vladimir Putin’s presidential 
mandate (2012), the emergence of Xi Jinping as China’s new leader (2012), and the Russian-
Western conflict in the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea as having generated 
new impulses for Sino-Russian relations and resulting in accelerating cooperation.  
 
Key drivers of the relationship 
All the interpretations proposed by the four volumes emphasise that the contemporary Sino-
Russian relationship is driven by common interests, as opposed to ideologies, emotions, 
sentiments or values. From this perspective, cooperation is first and foremost pragmatic. It is a 
way for Moscow and Beijing to achieve their respective goals in the international realm.  
All authors identify the United States as the fundamental driver behind the Sino-Russian 
rapprochement in the post-Cold War period. Russia and China’s key shared objective is to limit 
the Western primacy in international politics. Geopolitical and strategic considerations are of 
vital importance for decisionmakers in Moscow and Beijing. The elites in the two states 
understand that mutual cooperation ‘holds the potential to serve as a counterbalance to the 
United States on specific global and regional issue areas’ (Bolt and Cross, p. 155).  
The role of the West as a key driver is dual. Firstly, all authors see the role of structural factors. 
It has been US material domination and the ‘unipolar moment’ that paved the way for Sino-
Russian rapprochement after the end of the Cold War and continues to serve as a glue for the 
relationship. Even if it diminished over the last decade, the Western predominance continues 
to push Russia and China closer together (Lukin, p. 175-176). Secondly, particular policies of 
the West have potential to reinforce or slow down Sino-Russian collaboration. Every time 
tensions between either Russia or China on the one hand and the US on the other, emerge, 
Russian-Chinese cooperation goes a step further. ‘Playing the Chinese card’ is as useful for 
Moscow in its bargaining with Washington, as ‘playing the Russian card’ is for Beijing. 
Alexander Lukin argues that, without Western pressure on Russia in the form of sanctions, 
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Moscow would be a bit more restrained towards Beijing, but it would still take ‘no commands 
from the Euro-Atlantic political center’ (Lukin, p. 92-93). 
Even though Moscow and Beijing concurrently reject the US primacy in global politics, authors 
vary in their assessments of the extent to which both states remain dissatisfied with the liberal 
international order. Lubina interprets their shared worldview in terms of embracing 
multipolarity, which leads him to the conclusion that both states envision a future global 
concert of great powers (Lubina, p. 284). Lo, in turn, argues that Russia and China differ 
significantly in their attitudes towards the post-Cold War order, their understandings of 
multipolarity and related policies towards the US (Lo, p. xx). Both states have ‘contrasting 
visions of their respective places in the twenty first century global order’ (Lo, p. xv-xvi). While 
Russia is on the ‘losing’ end, China has vested interests in the preservation of at least some part 
of the international system. Bolt and Cross speak of ‘common views on most major world 
issues’ (p. 1), but notice that Russia’s and China’s dissatisfaction with the liberal order is 
selective and differentiated (Bolt and Cross, p. 154-155).  
Common interests that bring Russia and China closer together cannot be reduced to power-
political and strategic considerations. The factors of regime security and regime survival have 
gained on importance as a driving force behind the Sino-Russian relationship. Bolt and Cross 
emphasise that both states strive to establish the ‘legitimacy of authoritarianism’ (Bolt and 
Cross, p. 290) and attempt to prevent what they regard as Western interference in their domestic 
politics. Russian and Chinese ruling elites share similar views on what constitutes national 
security and recognize the link between internal and external threats. The criticism of colour 
revolutions, as coups sponsored by the West, exemplifies almost identical views prevailing in 
Moscow and Beijing. Lubina recognizes shared interests in regime survival but argues that 
Russia and China represent two distinct types of authoritarianism. The Russian version gives 
citizens more social freedom and less economic efficiency, while the Chinese – more economic 
and less social freedom (Lubina, p. 284). Lo remains most critical of alleged authoritarian 
convergence. In his view, such interpretation of motives behind Sino-Russian cooperation 
‘overstates the degree of like-mindedness and policy coordination’ between the two states (Lo, 
p. 98-99). 
Trying to explain the recent surge in cooperation between Russia and China, the authors point 
to the role of two states’ leaders, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Bolt and Cross draw attention 
to their strong-leadership styles and nationalistic credentials, while Lubina stresses the 
‘Bismarckian style’ of Putin and Xi. The two statesmen’ appetite for unconstrained power and 
close personal ties they had established have certainly given the relationship a higher profile. 
Only Alexandr Lukin emphasises the ‘objective’ continuity in Russian-Chinese relations and 
claims that the relations are independent from personalities. 
While both states struggle to overcome what they regard as humiliation suffered from the West, 
the role of status in mutual cooperation remains ambiguous. Lukin makes an explicit link 
between Russia’s dissatisfaction with the West and the failure to gain what Moscow perceives 
as an equal standing on the one hand, and closer cooperation with China on the other (Lukin, 
p. 175). Lo, in turn, recognizes China’s skilful approach to Russia and Beijing’s capability to 
respect Russian great-power ambitions as an element that facilitates cooperation. He does, 
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however, see China as exploiting symbolism to achieve concrete results in dealings with Russia 
(Lo, p. 21-22). 
 
Durability of current cooperation, its prospects and limitations 
The discussed books identify numerous flaws of Sino-Russian relations and obstacles to their 
transformation towards a fully-fledged alliance. Each of the authors identifies different 
challenges to the relationship. When we analyse them together, a long catalogue of weaknesses 
permeating the Russian-Chinese relationship appears. This list illustrates potential difficulties 
Moscow and Beijing face when attempting to forge closer cooperation. These weaknesses 
include: the legacy of past mistrust, Russia’s pivot to other Asian states, China’s growing 
assertiveness, Beijing’s increasing foothold in Central Asia, lingering threat perceptions, the 
situation in the Russian Far East, unbalanced trade, economic openness of China versus 
Russia’s protection of domestic industries, the competition for foreign investments, mutual 
ignorance, poor understanding of each other’s culture and a lack of true empathy, the absence 
of reciprocity in particular spheres, the unwillingness to support each other’s territorial claims.  
The most serious in the long-term perspective is the growing asymmetry between two states. 
Bobo Lo pays considerable attention to this issue: ‘one of the biggest tests facing Beijing and 
Moscow is to square notions of their strategic convergence and “equality” with the reality of 
an increasingly unequal interaction’ (Lo, p. xiv-xv). Still, he does not envision a scenario 
leading to an open clash of interests: ‘the Sino-Russian relationship seems set fair for continued 
cooperation’ (Lo, p. xxi). Bolt and Cross mention the power gap repeatedly (Bolt and Cross, p. 
26, 42-43) but they also do not see it as sufficient to derail the relationship. For Lubina, the 
asymmetry has turned into an essential feature of the relationship. Lukin, in turn, argues that 
the asymmetry refers only to the economic realm, whereas Russia enjoys primacy in the 
military sector and ‘global political influence’ (Lukin, p. x). In his view, the relationship is 
much more balanced than one might expect comparing both states’ economic indicators. 
Despite having identified so many weaknesses of the Sino-Russian relationship, all authors 
regard it as more resilient today than during the 2000s. None of the authors sees the conflict as 
plausible in the short- to mid-term perspective. Both states have more to lose from rivalry and 
remain conscious of the fate of the twentieth century failure of relations between communist 
‘brothers’. As a result, Moscow and Beijing take intentional steps to dissolve potential conflict 
in advance, as was the case of the Eurasian Economic Union and the New Silk Road. Even if 
solutions they propose might be deemed superficial and do not engage with the matter of the 
problem, they are still able to reduce potential tensions.  
 
Should the West be worried?  
Close ties between China and Russia have gradually turned into a growing headache for 
Western observers and policy-makers, especially in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea in 2014. Russia and China managed to limit the West’s domination in international 
politics, sometimes coordinating their actions, more often giving each other tacit but indirect 
support. In the case of Syria and Ukraine, China provided Russia with ‘strategic background’, 
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which allowed Moscow to successfully challenge the US and ‘the major tenets of the liberal 
international order’ (Bolt and Cross, p. 202). Both states checked the US hegemony, ‘thus 
advancing a vision of an international system that would legitimize authoritarian sovereignty 
over concerns with values of the liberal world order, including promoting democracy and 
human rights’ (Bolt and Cross, p. 204).  
All four books discussed in this essay warn against alarmism with regard to the Sino-Russian 
relationship. The authors agree that it would be difficult to speak of an anti-Western alliance 
in the making and point to a number of obstacles to closer cooperation between Moscow and 
Beijing. While ‘Moscow realizes that … China is a more reliable partner than the West’, a 
formal alliance remains unlikely, argues Lukin (Lukin, p. 190-192). Any such alliance would 
limit both states’ freedom of manoeuvre. It would not sit easily with their different policy styles 
and the desire to retain flexibility with regard to the US.  
At the same time, there is not much the West can do to weaken Sino-Russian ties. As long as 
the US remains the only superpower, Beijing and Moscow will strive to maintain close ties. 
The Western states have some potential to slow down Sino-Russian cooperation with 
specifically tailored policies, but it does not seem plausible that they are able to reverse the 
existing alignments and to drive a wedge between Russia and China. Furthermore, Bolt and 
Cross welcome the relationship as inducing a certain degree of stability into international 
politics, if only by diminishing the plausibility of conflict between two major non-Western 
powers. They also claim there is room for cooperation between Russia and China and the West 
(Bolt and Cross, p. 275). While the two states have potential for counter-balancing the West, 
they remain critical to addressing transnational security challenges (Bolt and Cross, p. 291). 
Lukin subscribes to this view and argues that the Sino-Russian partnership remains ‘one of the 
pillars of the emerging multipolar world order and a linchpin of global and regional stability’ 
(Lukin, p. 193). 
 
Conclusions 
The books discussed in this essay explore numerous aspects of Sino-Russian relations and offer 
differing interpretations. At the same time, they share important assumptions about 
international politics that influence their assessments of the relationship.  
First, all authors regard Russia and China as strategic and rational actors, fully conscious of 
and able to clearly define their national interests and to cooperate on the basis of those. As a 
result, the volumes pay scarce attention to domestic factors that have potential to influence 
foreign policy. While top leadership in Beijing and Moscow retains control over strategic 
direction of their respective foreign policies, the implementation depends on a number of 
domestic actors (see for instance Hameiri and Jones 2016). While discussing developments in 
Russian-Chinese relations in the 1990s, Lukin’s book paid a lot of attention to different 
domestic players and the role of their parochial interests. When analysing the developments in 
Putin’s era, Lukin portrayed Russia’s policy towards China as a purely rational and strategic 
undertaking.  
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Secondly, the Sino-Russian relationship appears to be predetermined by structural factors, 
leaving little place for both states’ agency. The US primacy binds them together but there are 
insurmountable obstacles that prevent Moscow and Beijing from forming a fully-fledged 
alliance. This creates the impression that regardless of particular steps taken by Russia or 
China, both states remain stuck in the early-1990s model, in which cooperation keeps 
expanding but they are unable to transform it into an alliance. The Russian-Chinese relationship 
has turned into a structural element of global international politics. As a result, we should 
expect continuity rather than change. 
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